The relation of perception and action based on a heterarchy of final purposes by GRÜNEBERG Patrick & Patrick GRÜNEBERG
The relation of perception and action based on
a heterarchy of final purposes
著者別名 GRUNEBERG Patrick
journal or
publication title
Studies In Philosphy
volume 44
page range 82(77)-75(84)
year 2019-03-28
URL http://doi.org/10.15068/00155159
The relation of perception and action based on a heterarchy of final purposes
77
Introduction
??Opposed to the modular view that perception and action are two separate capacities, re-
cent approaches in cognitive science propose the view that perception and action depend on 
each other.1 Opposed to these approaches that conceive both capacities separately and then 
consider their relationship, Fichte explains the unity of perception and action in the Facts of 
Consciousness 1810/11. His genetic approach allows developing this unity out of the basic 
practical capacity. Based on a priori-functional analysis, Fichte considers a particular type of 
image that unites perception and action. These images constitute perceptual reality. They do 
not depict a given reality, but form the medium by which human subjects create perceptual re-
ality through action. In this sense, he proposes a constitutive or, as I shall explain, a projective 
type of image. The problem of judging these images comes up in Fichte’s a priori-functional 
exposition of these projective images. He is in need of some criteria to explain whether an im-
age is a meaningful image in terms of a successful guidance of action. Fichte’s answer consists 
in his well-known insistence on morality and the moral law. Thus, in order to give meaning 
to the functional play of images, all image production has to follow the moral law as the ﬁnal 
purpose of all human action and being.
??Through an analysis of Fichte’s concept of a projective image, I will try to show that his 
exclusive determination of the ﬁnal purpose in terms of the moral law is not mandatory. For 
this purpose, I will ﬁrst analyze the functional nexus between perception and action: images 
as the basis of outer perception originate as the practical design of reality according to the 
intentions of an agent and the external resistance against these intentions. In this sense, outer 
perception does not depict a given reality, but forms the product of practical decision-making 
and real-world action. This functional conception of projective images allows Fichte to explain 
the unity of perception and action. Second, I will point out the functional need for a criterion to 
determine these images, and explain the arbitrariness of Fichte’s solution. Third, I will intro-
duce the concept of the heterarchy that allows for a complex of ﬁnal purposes. In functional 
terms, there are further candidates for judging images that are not founded rationally, such as 
aesthetic or ecological criteria. The concept of a heterarchy of ﬁnal purposes allows securing 
the functional validity of projection while appreciating the complex and manifold reality of the 
human lifeworld.
The relation of perception and action based on 
a heterarchy of final purposes
Patrick GRÜNEBERG (Kanazawa University)
1  Cf. Bishop, J. M. and Martin, A. O. (eds.): Contemporary Sensorimotor Theory, New York 2014, and Engel, 
A. K., Friston, K. J. and Kragic, D. (eds.): The pragmatic turn: toward action-oriented views in cognitive sci-
ence, Cambridge, Massachusetts 2015.
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1  The image of resistance as the nexus between perception and action
??The concept of the image, alternatively the scheme, is present in Fichte’s entire later 
works. It forms the basic constituent of the transcendental capacity underlying any produc-
tion of consciousness, or as Fichte says, knowledge. In the course of the Facts of consciousness 
1810/11, he develops the “image of the resistance”2 in order to explain the relation between 
perception and action in the “objective image of the world”3 that breaks down into four mo-
ments: 1) A system of individual I’s corresponds to 2) a numerically same system of organized 
“bodies”4. 3) The I’s view themselves in the sensory world of outer perception. Moreover, 
the sensory world contains the products of the individual efﬁcacy of every I. 4) These prod-
ucts are intersubjectively perceivable. The relation between perception and action originates 
in an inhibition of the most fundamental activity underlying any consciousness. Fichte calls 
this activity “life” and explains consciousness as the workings of the capacities of this life.5 
The causality of the absolute life becomes inhibited so that there results “a causality which is 
no causality”6, or a drive. Based on this inhibition, consciousness emerges in terms of “self-
awareness”7 and an inner sense. Moreover, a consciousness of the capacity to be efﬁcient 
emerges, i.e. “an intuition of the real capacity for the sake of causality in the sphere of being”8. 
The individual I intuits its possible efﬁcacy ideally.
??The ideal intuition of the real capacity forms the starting point for real efﬁcacy in that the 
I imagines state d that it cannot directly cause. Nevertheless, the I can also imagine state a 
that it can realize and that serves as a starting point of a causal chain to d and as an immediate 
cause of b. The same causal relation holds between b and c, and c and d so that the I posits a 
concept of purpose9 with this ideal sequence of a causality to be realized. In order to form this 
concept of an action, or as Fichte expresses himself, in order to “calculate”10 real action, a fur-
ther condition for the material realization of action is required: the image of the resistance. This 
image connects the different I’s in terms of the individuality and historicity of the products of 
their actions.
??In the intersubjective context of the I’s, Fichte distinguishes two spheres of sensory intu-
2  “Bild des Widerstandes”: Fichte, J. G.: Die Thatsachen des Bewußtseyns 18010/1811, in: H. G. von Manz, 
E. Fuchs, R. Lauth and I. Radrizzani (eds.): J. G. Fichte. Die späten wissenschaftlichen Vorlesungen I. 1809-
1811 (frommann-holzboog Studientexte 1). Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 2000 = TB10/11, p. 327 (transl. P.G.).
3 “objektive Weltvorstellung”: ibid.
4 “Leiber”: ibid.
5 Cf. ibid, p. 275ff.
6 “eine Kausalität, die keine Kausalität hat”: ibid., p. 275.
7 “Selbstgefühl”: ibid., p. 276.
8 “Anschauung des realen Vermögens [...] zur Kausalität in der Sphäre des Seyns”: ibid., p. 277.
9 Cf. ibid., p. 277f.
10 “berechnen”: ibid., p. 290.
11  Cf. ibid., p. 331.
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ition in relation to individual actions and their products.11 First, the sphere of natural develop-
ment that comes as a process and not as contingent actions. Historic contingence assumes 
that an object or event could have individualized in another way. However, natural events do 
not imply this variability of intentional initiation that lies at the ground of human action. Cor-
respondingly, the second sphere of intended action is variable through freedom. In the course 
of realizing an action, in which an I individualizes itself in a certain concept of an action or its 
product, in this, as Fichte expresses, “actus individuationis”12, the I posits a concept of action 
without any law and with freedom (spontaneity). The I determines itself materially so that the 
product of this lawless action becomes individual and contingent. With this, only the initiation 
(inducement) of the product is contingent, not its material realization in the imagination that 
works according to the general laws of thought and intuition.13
??Because all action comes down to manipulation of matter, an I has to deal with its sur-
rounding material world in the course of calculating the concept of an action. An action will 
never start from the scratch, but builds on the existing material situation that comprises the 
results of all previous actions and natural processes. If the I projects its concept of purpose 
(the causal series of intended action), this projection is determined by the actual material 
condition of the world and becomes the image of the resistance - resistance of the material 
world against the ideal concept of purpose. In particular, it can happen to an individual I that 
an action is not possible because the corresponding matter has already been manipulated 
in a way that a manipulation according to its own concept is not any more possible: “What 
has been done, is done, and cannot been done again neither by the initiator nor by someone 
else.”14 It is “this immediate consciousness of not-being-able-to according to a factual expres-
sion of freedom, the necessary recognition of factual being”15 through which individual and 
contingent contents become perceivable. An action proves unfeasible through individual and 
contingent facts so that such facts determine the I and come up as perceivable contents in the 
image of the resistance, i.e. through the speciﬁc kind how they inhibit the capacity for action 
(causality). The meaning of individuality and historicity consists in how they restrict the plan 
of a concept for action. Accordingly, they own relevance for the genesis of action, i.e. they own 
epistemic relevance in terms of imparting knowledge about impossible actions in the course 
of calculating a concept of action. This does not imply knowledge of the outer world in terms 
of a representational relation to reality, but rather knowledge about the products of other I’s 
insofar these are relevant for its own acting.16
12 Ibid., p. 340.
13 Cf. ibid., p. 290ff.
14  “Was gethan ist, ist gethan, und kann nicht wieder gethan werden weder von dem Urheber, noch von 
irgend einem andern.”: ibid., p. 345.
15  “dieses unmittelbare Bewußtseyn des Nichtkönnens zufolge einer faktischen Freiheitsäußerung, die 
nothwendige Anerkennung des faktischen Seyns”: ibid., p. 346.
16  Fichte primarily discusses the relevance of products of other I’s, but the relevance of the (natural) environ-
ment of the acting I could be added to the constraints of action. 
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??The image of the resistance solely fulﬁlls the function that the I calculates the concept of a 
possible action and acts causally through the realization of this concept. Thus, the outer sense 
and perception result from a projection of the inner sense onto the outer material environment 
that becomes the perceived outer world as resistance to the original causality of the I. The 
image of the resistance establishes this relation between perception and the realization of ac-
tion. In sum, following the concept of projection, we depend on intuitive (perceivable) contents 
and refer to a given material world in order to act. At the same time, these intuitive contents 
are the result of our individual purposes because our acting (our initiation to act) generates 
outer perception. In this sense, the unity of perception and action consists in the image of the 
resistance as a product of practical decision-making.
2  Final purposes and material criteria
??According to Fichte, consciousness depends on a drive for action. The projective rela-
tion between perception and action appeared in that perception is the consciousness of not-
being-able-to, thus in the end action consciousness. The concept of projection clariﬁes this 
foundation in terms of an intended realization of purposes, whereby the world is covered with 
intentions and in this way gets meaning as world. Regarding this projection of the world in per-
ception and action, Fichte posits the important question of giving meaning. If consciousness 
should not only be “a play of free activity and expression of power”17, what should an I use its 
capacity for? Which purpose does it follow? For the sake of which concept of purpose, which 
causal chain is the image of the resistance formed? These questions are important because 
criteria are necessary in order to determine actions and their products within a functional ar-
chitecture which Fichte develops in transcendental terms.18 Such an architecture can only be 
realized if a ﬁnal purpose is known so that can be stated under which conditions a projection 
or an action could be counted as meaningful.19
??Fichte’s answer to the question of the normative determinant of consciousness is well 
known: The ﬁnal purpose of free action consists in morality. In this perspective, the sensory 
world and nature as well as the individual person provide the media of a moral world-order. 
17  “Schauspiel [...] von freier Thätigkeit und Kraftäußerung”: ibid., p. 357; cf. Jacobs, W. G.: Der Gottesbegriff 
in den ‚Thatsachen des Bewußtseyns von 1810/11‘ als Übergang zur Wissenschaftslehre in specie, in: 
Fichte-Studien 29 (2006), pp. 211-224, here p. 214f.
18  The deductive method that Manz shows up in the TB 10/11 regarding the “conditions of the possibility 
of a moment of knowledge” or the proof “that they [the moments of knowledge] are to be understood 
only as conditions of possibility of a ‘higher’ moment of knowledge” (Manz, H. G. von: Die Funktion der 
‚Tatsachen des Bewußtseins‘ im Blick auf die Wissenschaftslehre, in: Fichte-Studien 31 (2007), pp. 205-217, 
here p. 211; transl. P.G.) can be characterized functionally in that Fichte analyzes the immanent functions 
of capacities of knowledge.
19  The same problem comes up in present naturalistic approaches to consciousness where teleofunctionalism 
proposes evolutionist criteria (cf. Sober, E.: “Putting the Function back into Functionalism”, in: Lycan, W. 
G. (ed.): Mind and Cognition. A Reader. 1990, pp. 97-106).
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Even if this ﬁnal purpose never realizes entirely, the individual should aim on it “to the best 
of one’s knowledge and belief”20. Ideally, there is no demand to the drive, but the will is the 
moral law, is a “holy will”21. Methodologically speaking, Fichte makes use of a material crite-
rion for determining the validity of action insofar the concept of morality or the moral law limit 
the transcendental capacity to speciﬁc actions. Thereby, he goes in line with Kant’s concept 
of the ﬁnal purpose and the human as a moral being.22 At the same time, Fichte speciﬁes the 
regulative function of the moral law in terms of his “doctrine of duties”.23 In the end, the moral 
law “becomes a Must for the individual”24 that spells out dutiful action for the individual. With 
regard to Fichte’s intellectual horizon, this material moment rests on the a priori conditions 
of knowledge and goes back to his historic-cultural roots, i.e. Christian ideas25 - which ﬁnal 
purpose one chooses, also depends on the person.
??Considering Fichte’s genetic approach, the necessity of a material criterion for judging 
action is obvious. Another question is whether consciousness amounts to nothing more than 
the moral law and a morality independent of any sensual drive. Alternatively, it might be asked 
whether other functional parts of consciousness should be considered. Surely, moral criteria 
are of particular importance for action. Nevertheless, from a genetic viewpoint, there is no a 
priori necessity to adhere to rationality-based morality as the exclusive criterion for judging 
actions. Rather, there may be several criteria possible.
3  Heterarchy of final purposes
??Consequently understood, the genetic imperative implies a fundamental openness. On 
the one hand, the transcendental analysis clariﬁes the a priori-functional structure, the laws of 
consciousness. On the other hand, this focus on laws and principles opens the transcendental 
analysis for material criteria when it comes to explain the realization of consciousness. This 
openness can be seen as the ﬁnal dialectics where transcendental analysis and reality meet - a 
dialectics that Fichte tried to avoid by means of his moral rigorism, but which is inevitable if 
the genetic imperative keeps valid because the a priori-functional analysis does not provide 
exclusive material criteria for determining action.
??Except Fichte‘s historic contingency and his choice for morality, there is also a meth-
odological reason for Fichte escaping this ﬁnal dialectics. His entire architecture rests on a 
hierarchical setup with the moral law and ﬁnally God closing the system. However, this setup 
surprises all the more as Fichte proposes a relational method with the relation constituting the 
20  “bestem Wissen und Gewissen”: TB10/11, p. 382.
21 “heiliger Wille”: ibid; cf. Jacobs 2006, p. 217f.
22  Cf. Jacobs 2006, p. 214 and Ivaldo, M.: “Sittlicher ‘Begriff’ als wirklichkeitsbildendes Prinzip in der späten 
Sittenlehre”, in: Fichte-Studien 32 (2009), pp. 189-201, here p. 197.
23  “Pflichtenlehre”: Fichte, J. G.: “Sittenlehre 1812”, in: Lauth, R. et al. (eds.): Fichte-Gesamtausgabe der 
Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Bd. II, 13, Bad Cannstatt 2002, pp. 301-392, here p. 380.
24 “wird zum Müssen für das Individuum”: TB10/11, p. 374. 
25 Cf. Pecina, B.: Fichtes Gott, Tübingen 2007.
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relata. Accordingly, the relation as the genetic ground of knowledge comes ﬁrst. Within the re-
lation, any determination of knowledge, including the material determination of action, comes 
as one relatum that depends on other relata and is thus not exclusive or absolute.26 Taken to-
gether, the following problem arises: Material criteria are needed to determine actions. At the 
same time, the genetic method does not provide one highest element that governs all other 
elements exclusively. Rather, there exist several candidates for the material determination of 
action whereby a ﬁnal decision has to be made in case of conﬂicting criteria. A hierarchy 
circumvents this problem, as a hierarchy is a ﬁxed order of elements - as in the case of the 
moral law governing the projection of action and the genesis of the image of the resistance 
(perception), thereby a priori prioritizing one speciﬁfc type of material determination of ac-
tion. However, the a priori-functional approach can only justify this subordination under one 
material criterion when it neglects the genetic imperative at the same time.
??The alternative is a heterarchy. McCulloch ﬁrst introduced the term in 1945 in the context 
of describing the neural behavior of reﬂexes. He concluded that an organism has a “heterar-
chy of values, and is thus internectively too rich to submit to a summum bonum.”27 In 1971, 
Günther elaborated the logical foundations of the heterarchy in order to explain the relation 
of cognition and volition. He proposed that cognition and volition are not opposed capacities 
where one governs the other exclusively, but that human consciousness builds on an interre-
lation of both faculties with varying degrees of prevalence of the one or the other.28 Günther’s 
approach corresponds to the ﬁndings of Fichte’s transcendental analysis of consciousness 
where the interrelation of perception and action constitutes a conscious experience. More 
recently, the concept of the heterarchy has become popular in the social sciences, and “may 
be deﬁned as the relation of elements to one another when they are unranked or when they 
possess the potential for being ranked in a number of different ways.”29 Thus, any element pos-
sesses a degree of autonomy so that the overall order can vary according to the autonomous 
behavior of every single element and their interplay.
??The relevant point is that heterarchy and hierarchy are not mutually exclusive. Rather, 
a heterarchy can contain hierarchies or form a part of a hierarchy. On the one hand, the ele-
26  Cf. Zöller, G.: Fichte lesen, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 2013, pp. 47-64 for Fichte’s relational approach.
27  McCulloch, W. S.: “A heterarchy of values determined by the topology of nervous nets”, in: The bulletin of 
mathematical biophysics 7/2 (1945), pp. 89-93, here p. 92.
28  Cf.  Günther, G.: “Cognition and Volition. A Contribution to a Cybernetic Theory of Subjectivity”, in: Ameri-
can Society for Cybernetics (ed.): Cybernetics Technique in Brain Research and the Educational Process, 
Washington D.C. 1971, pp. 119-135. Grüneberg et al. proposed a heterarchic organization of action control 
(cf. Grüneberg, P., Kadone, H. and Suzuki, K.: “Voluntary initiation of movement: multifunctional integra-
tion of subjective agency”, in: Frontiers Psychology 6 (2015), pp. 688, and Grüneberg, P. et al.: “Robot-assist-
ed voluntary initiation reduces control-related difﬁculties of initiating joint movement: A phenomenal ques-
tionnaire study on shaping and compensation of forward gait”, in: PLOS ONE 13/3 (2018), pp. e0194214).
29  Crumley, C. L.: “Heterarchy and the Analysis of Complex Societies”, in: Archeological Papers of the Ameri-
can Anthropological Association 6/1 (2008), pp. 1-5, here p. 3.
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ments of a heterarchy, in our case possible candidates for ﬁnal purposes, are ordered equally 
or horizontally, i.e. there is not one predetermined element governing the others. This open-
ness implies several candidates for guiding the projection. On the other hand, decisions have 
to be made so that some hierarchical (vertical) preference of one element over the other is 
needed. A heterarchy combines the need for horizontal and vertical order: all elements are 
equal while one element governs the other. The hierarchical element is not determined deﬁ-
nitely, but can change. It is just required that there is one governing element in order to come 
to a decision.
??Coming back to the discussion of the projective image of the resistance in light of the ge-
netic imperative, a heterarchy allows for projection based on varying ﬁnal purposes or, more 
precisely, a complex of different ﬁnal purposes with each exerting a different valence in the 
course of an action. In terms of the categorical imperative, Fichte made use of the moral law 
as a regular function according to which the heterarchy of values includes one hierarchic 
moment for decision. Whereas this normative moment is formally necessary for decision-
making, the speciﬁc kind of rational normativity that Fichte proposes is rather not exclusive. 
Beside the rational foundation of the moral law, the required normativity could also be spelled 
out in criteria such as aesthetic design principles30, pragmatic criteria for arranging things ac-
cording to situative needs, criteria of complexity for elucidating the hidden structure of things 
or processes as in the sciences, or ecological criteria for establishing sustainable interaction 
between humans and the environment.
??Thus, in a heterarchic complex, the criteria to determine a projective image (i.e. the value 
of perception for action) are not necessarily of rational nature. Instead, several criteria can 
join in a complex of ﬁnal purposes with different preferences. While the heterarchic form of a 
complex of ﬁnal purposes is determined a priori, the heterarchic content of such a complex can 
only be determined in actu; i.e. the acting subject decides about the kind of normativity and 
the resulting order of ﬁnal purposes in the course of decision-making and acting.
Conclusion
??Considering the need for a criterion to determine the “mere play of capacities”, is the pro-
posed “openness”, the heterarchy question begging? Does it avoid the question for the ﬁnal 
criterion? Will it end into relativism when relativizing the absolute valence of rational morality? 
Surely not. While, from a heterarchic viewpoint, only negotiations of all involved parties can 
lead to the actual choice of a material criterion for determining action, there would apply stan-
dards of accepting and rejecting criteria. In rational and legal terms, it is at least required that 
a determination is explainable and open to justiﬁcation so that the discourse about criteria for 
action is not arbitrary, whereas this explicability does not imply that the normative determina-
tion itself builds on rational criteria. In sum, the a priori-functional analysis of consciousness 
30  Cf. formal design principles as suggested by Riegel, A.: Historische Grammatik der bildenden Künste, ed. by 
Karl Maria Swoboda and Otto Pächt, Köln 1966.
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can state the functional need for a ﬁnal purpose and demand a material answer. At the same 
time (due to the genetic imperative), it cannot provide one exclusive material answer because 
the teleofunctional31 determination of action allows for different solutions. It is rather the ﬁnal 
relational dialectics that decides about the normative ground for action in continuous interac-
tion between agents and their environment. 
??As Fichte said: the Doctrine of Scientific Knowledge is “a vivid, always new and freshly 
produced thought that speaks out itself under every condition of time and communication in 
different ways”32; it is “an experiment that has to be repeated steadily”33 - in contrast to Fichte, 
as should be added - an experiment with the material world. In line with Fichte, the formal 
outcome will remain the same, i.e. the need for a normative criterion for action, but the con-
tents, the material distinctions (here ﬁnal purposes), or more precisely, the order and ranking 
of material prevalence will vary over time and in respect to the demands and constraints of 
actual situations. In this sense, the heterarchic organization of perception and action could 
spell out the necessary plasticity (historicity and contingency) of human action that every a 
priori-functional analysis faces.
31  From a heterarchic viewpoint, teleofunctionalism is not limited to evolutionist criteria (cf. note 19).
32  “ein lebendiger, ewig neu, u. frisch zu producirender Gedanke, der unter jeder anderen Bedingung der 
Zeit, u. der Mittheilung sich anders ausspricht”: Fichte, J. G.: “Wissenschaftslehre Erlangen 1805”, in: R. 
Lauth, and H. Jacob (eds.): Fichte-Gesamtausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Bd. II, 9. 
Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1993, pp. 179-311, hier: p. 181f.
33  “stets zu wiederholende[s] Experiment”: ibid.
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